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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”) is a unique
administrative law venue, one that in recent years has become a hotspot for
enforcing intellectual property rights.1 Section 337 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930 (“Section 337”) grants the Commission a powerful tool and broad
discretion: the authority to enjoin parties from importing articles that infringe U.S.
intellectual property rights.2 In a little over a decade, the number of Section 337
cases ballooned from only twenty-five in 20003 to “a record high of 103” in 2010.4
The significant increase in patent-related Section 337 investigations “suggest[s]
that, contrary to congressional intent, the ITC has become a general forum for

* J.D., 2012, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.M.E., 2008, University of
Dayton. Thanks to Professor Mark Janis and Andrew Riley, who helped plant the seeds for
this Comment, and to Claudia and Steve Allen for their continuing support and critiques of
the Comment. Thanks also to the Indiana Law Journal Board of Editors for accepting this
Comment and for their superb contributions.
1. Thomas A. Broughan, III, Modernizing § 337’s Domestic Industry Requirement for
the Global Economy, 19 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 41, 41 (2009) (“The [ITC] is an increasingly
popular venue for entities seeking to enforce their patent rights.”).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); see also John C. Evans, Note, Addressing Default Trends
in Patent-Based Section 337 Proceedings in the United States International Trade
Commission, 106 MICH. L. REV. 745, 749–50 (2008).
3. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2000 16 (2000),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/year_in_review/PUB3445.pdf.
4. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2010 14 (2010),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/year_in_review/pub4212.pdf.
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enforcing patent rights rather than a forum for protecting domestic companies.”5
The trend is so pronounced that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has appellate jurisdiction over the ITC,6 recently found itself in disagreement
about the nature of the forum and whether it is “charged . . . with administering a
statute having a primary purpose of enforcing valid intellectual property rights.”7
Unlike the Patent Act,8 which provides the statutory authority to bring an action
for patent infringement in federal district court, the statutory provisions that govern
Section 337 actions expressly mandate consideration of the public interest when
determining a remedy for patent infringement.9 The statute provides that “[i]f the
Commission determines . . . that there is a violation of [the] section, it shall direct
that the articles concerned . . . be excluded from entry into the United States,
unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and
welfare . . . it finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry.”10
While there is no analogous statutory provision in the Patent Act, consideration
of the public interest is part of the common law applicable to remedies for patent
infringement. Historically, only in very “rare instances”11 were patentees denied
injunctions in the name of the “public interest”—mostly regarding the public
health.12 The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,13
however, articulated a rule for granting injunctions that firmly embedded in the
common law a public interest consideration similar to that implemented by the
ITC.14 In eBay, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that “a
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged.”15 The Court instead implemented what is called “the traditional fourfactor test [for injunctions],”16 one factor of which requires the patentee to
affirmatively show whether “the public interest would . . . be [served or] disserved
by a permanent injunction.”17

5. Broughan, supra note 1, at 43.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
7. John Mezzalingua Assocs. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Reyna, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (objecting to the majority’s
characterization of the ITC as “fundamentally a trade forum, not an intellectual property
forum”).
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006).
9. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006).
10. Id.
11. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
12. See, e.g., Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146
F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945) (public interest warranted refusal of injunction on irradiation of
oleomargarine); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934)
(injunction refused against city operation of sewage disposal plant because of public health
danger).
13. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
14. Id. at 393–94.
15. Id. (citing MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
16. Id. at 393.
17. Id. at 391.
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The Federal Circuit confronted the similarity between the two public interest
doctrines—the ITC and the common law—in Spansion, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission,18 holding that the two do not necessarily inform one another.19 The
Federal Circuit held that “[t]he difference between exclusion orders granted under
Section 337 and injunctions granted under the Patent Act . . . follows the longstanding principle that importation is treated differently than domestic activity.”20
Yet, that holding is unfulfilling; one cannot help but compare and contrast the
two.21 In either scenario, the public interest is positioned to trump an intellectual
property owner’s fundamental ability to exclude others.22
There is every indication that the “public interest” is poised to take a more
prominent role in patent litigation.23 In fact, the ITC recently finalized a rule that

18. 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
19. Id.; id. at 1357 (addressing whether “the public interest inquiry in this context is
similar to the traditional test for injunctive relief that district courts apply under [eBay]”).
20. Id. at 1359 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Certain Baseband
Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control
Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, Inv. No. 337TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, *102 n.230 (USITC June 19, 2007)); see also United States
v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973).
21. Litigants that have been attracted to the ITC because it is perceived as an easier
forum to seek injunctive relief after eBay certainly might weigh the differences between the
“public interest factors” of each forum. See, e.g., Broughan, supra note 1, at 73–74
(comparing and contrasting the eBay factors with the public interest factors used in
Section 337 investigations, stating: “The equitable discretion available to the ITC differs
from the discretion granted to district courts when evaluating a permanent injunction;
however, it is more than adequate to address the problems with [non-practicing entities].”
(citations omitted)); Robert J. Walters & Christopher G. Paulraj, Is a Revival of the “Public
Interest” Factors in the Works by the ITC?, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Oct.
14, 2011), http://news.bna.com/ptdm (“Another benefit recognized by complainants in ITC
investigations is that the ITC is not bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, which limited the availability of injunctive relief in district court civil
actions. Nonetheless, it may come as a surprise that the ITC is not necessarily required to
issue a remedial order . . . .” (emphasis in original)); see also Rules of Adjudication and
Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,803, 64,806 (Oct. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt.
210) (discussing whether the Commission should adopt the standard for obtaining a
permanent injunction set forth in eBay).
22. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights, in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 156 (Ellen Frankel Paul
& Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (“The Madisonian explanation gains force when contract
and property rights are distinguished not on the conventional ground but on a more
sophisticated legal basis expounded by Professor Wesley Hohfeld. Under his analysis, the
distinctive feature of property is that it is a right ‘good against the world,’ while contract is a
right good only against determinate persons . . . .”); Richard B. Klar, Ebay Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C.: The Right to Exclude Under U.S. Patent Law and the Public Interest,
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 852, 858 (2006) (“The constitution provides for the
framework for a patent owner to have exclusive rights within the system. The right to
exclude is of primary importance in order to encourage inventors to share their technology
with the public in exchange for a limited (by time) monopoly.”).
23. Broughan, supra note 1, at 73 (“Thus, it is no longer proper to categorically assume
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will allow the agency to gather more information on the potential public interest
issues resulting from a Section 337 investigation.24 The new rule requires
complainants seeking to block allegedly infringing goods from the United States to
file a separate statement, concurrently with a complaint, discussing the “public
interest[s]” involved.25 This move shifts the consideration of the public interest
from the background, a final safety valve, to the very forefront of an
investigation.26
At the same time, both patent law commentators and the Federal Circuit have
signaled that it is important to refocus on intellectual property as a fundamental
property right. For example, in the Federal Circuit’s recent opinion in Robert Bosch
LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., Judge O’Malley commented on patent rights in
the post-eBay era: “[E]ven though a successful patent infringement plaintiff can no
longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request for a permanent
injunction, it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the fundamental
nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude.”27 In
his recent book, Justifying Intellectual Property,28 Professor Robert Merges makes
the observation that “courts often wind up talking about IP rights as rights,” but are
often too busy “to notice the significance of this move.”29
In response, Merges makes it the purpose of Justifying Intellectual Property to
“notice” the shift from regarding intellectual property as a system of social utility to
one of fundamental rights, noting that “the hallmark of a right is that social utility
alone is not reason enough to override it.”30 Merges develops a framework for
in every case that the public interest favors injunctive relief in patent infringement cases
without balancing the interest in IP protection with the public’s countervailing interests.”);
see also Dennis Crouch, Injunctive Relief and the Public Interest at the ITC, PATENTLYO L.
BLOG (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/injunctive-relief-and-thepublic-interest-at-the-itc.html.
24. Jacqueline Bell, ITC Adopts New Public Interest Rule for Patent Cases, LAW 360
(Oct. 19, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/279045; Rossella Brevetti, ITC
Amends Rules to Get More Info on Public Interest in Section 337 Cases, PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Oct. 25, 2011), http://news.bna.com/ptdm.
25. Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 64,803. The notice states
that the new regulations are slightly different from the proposed rules which “require that the
complainant provide in its complaint specific information regarding how issuance of an
exclusion order and/or a cease and desist order in an investigation could affect the public
health and welfare in the United States.” Id. at 64,804. The new rules provide that, “instead
of including public interest information in the complaint, complainants will be required to
file a separate statement of public interest concurrently with the filing of the complaint.” Id.
at 64,805. The final regulations contained eleven changes from the proposed rules, published
in 75 Fed. Reg. 60,671 (Oct. 1, 2010), which were available to the public for comment.
Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 64,804.
26. See Bell, supra note 24.
27. 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Zoltek Corp. v.
United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“My concern
with my colleagues’ position starts with their apparent rejection of the premise that patents
are property and subject to the Fifth Amendment.”).
28. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
29. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
30. Id.; see also id. at 302 (“I have tried not to even talk about balance, but instead to
show what it looks like, in detail.” (emphasis in original)).
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justifying intellectual property as “a right first” using the philosophical cannons of
John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls.31 Necessarily, Merges also discusses
instances when it is permissible to exempt infringement of intellectual property.
Along a similar, but more narrow vein, this Comment utilizes Merges’s model
to explore the justifiability of using public interest factors—particularly in the
ITC—to strip a patent owner of his or her right to exclude and assesses the
effectiveness of public interest considerations in patent forums. Part I explores the
development of public interest factors in both federal district court and ITC patent
litigation. This Part will explore the rare, anomalous cases where the public interest
has successfully prevailed over an exclusion order and survey several cases where
public interest was overcome. Part II explores and extracts the relevant portions of
Professor Merges’s framework for justifying intellectual property, reconciling his
theories with other theories of property along the way. Part III tests the fact patterns
of several of the example cases against Merges’s philosophical framework. Finally,
Part IV assesses the effectiveness of the public interest consideration and suggests
how litigation arising under the Patent Act might borrow from the experiences of
the ITC. Part IV proposes that developing and/or codifying a doctrine of
compulsory licensing in one or both forums might best implement a Merges-type
framework. It concludes that, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s comments in
Spansion, the two forums might indeed “inform” one another.32
I. PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE PATENT LAWS
While elementary in nature, this discussion must begin with a basic premise: a
patent is intellectual property and intellectual property is a form of personal
property.33 By definition, an element of property is the right to exclude others34—it

31. Id. at 305 (“I moved from a conventional utilitarian understanding of IP rights to
something else, something based on the nonutiliatrian philosophical ideas of Locke, Kant,
and Rawls.”).
32. Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see
also Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 529, 533 (2009) (proposing that “Congress amend § 337 to harmonize ITC patent
law with the Patent Act”).
33. See, e.g., Patricia L. Farnese, Patently Unreasonable: Reconsidering the
Responsibility of Patentees in Today’s Inventive Climate, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1,
4 (2004) (“A patent is a property right. Most people associate property rights with
ownership.”).
34. The right to exclude is statutorily recognized under the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1) (2006). There is a voluminous literature discussing the in rem nature of a
property right. See, e.g., DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 109 (2000) (stating that “[t]he
most striking difference between contract law and property law is that while a contract right
is good only against the other party to the contract, a property right is good against the
world”); WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 18 (1979) (“The right to property is the
power to exclude others from or give them access to a benefit or use of the particular
object.”); Farnese, supra note 33, at 4 (“[Patent] ownership is associated with exclusive
possession, control and enjoyment of a specific res, by a particular person.”); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1121
(1990) (defining property as the “right . . . to exclude others from the use of [an] asset”).
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is often said that it is a right good against the world.35 That right is not unbounded,
however: “Because property (like all rights) permits private individuals to bring the
power of the state to bear against other citizens, the conditions surrounding the use
of this power are always relevant, always of interest to the legal system.”36 One
way the fundamental right of a patent owner to exclude others is bounded is by
consideration of the “public interest.” While the invocation of the public interest as
a way to circumvent the right to exclude may be considered a “rarity”37 due to its
historically infrequent success, it is a consideration provided for in actions arising
under the Patent Act and in ITC investigations. Going forward, litigating and
adjudicating public interest factors will likely become much more common.38
A. The Public Interest in the Patent Act
There is no statutory basis for federal district courts to invoke public interest to
deny a permanent injunction to a litigant who successfully establishes infringement
of a valid patent. Rather, public interest enters the scene by way of the common law
governing remedies. For many years, however, not even the common law allowed
much equitable discretion over the grant of injunctions. The Federal Circuit,
established in 198239 with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over causes of action
arising under the Patent Act,40 established a historical precedent of essentially
granting injunctions automatically once infringement was found.41
Historically, the Federal Circuit only denied permanent injunctions in extremely
“rare instances” where a patentee’s decision not to practice the patent “frustrate[d]
an important public need for the invention.”42 The Federal Circuit’s preference to
grant permanent injunction “stems from a belief that once infringement has been

35. For example, William Blackstone once defined property as “that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *2; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001) (stating that one
conception of property is that “property is a distinctive type of right to a thing, good against
the world”).
36. MERGES, supra note 28, at 12.
37. See Walters & Paulraj, supra note 21 (noting that the “ITC has only rarely
considered these public interest factors to be dispositive in its determination”); Certain Home
Vacuum Packaging Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-496, USITC 3681, at 3–4 (Mar. 1, 2004)
(Final); see also Kumar, supra note 32, at 567 (stating that “[i]f the ITC finds that an
imported article infringes a patent, then the default presumption under § 337 is that it will
award an exclusion order” and that “denials of injunctive relief after a finding of
infringement are extremely uncommon”).
38. See, e.g., Walters & Paulraj, supra note 21.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006). The Federal Circuit was established under Ronald
Reagan’s Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and charged with creating uniformity
amongst the patent laws. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
41. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir.
1989); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
42. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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established denying a patentee the right to exclude is contrary to the laws of
property.”43 Before 2006, the case law regarding the public interest in patent
infringement litigation over permanent injunctions was sparse. Most cases
containing any relevant discussions about the public interest only did so in the
context of preliminary injunctions, before a patent was found to be valid and
infringed.44
It was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange
LLC45 that district courts were given, in a practical sense, equitable discretion over
injunctions in patent infringement cases.46 The Court chastised the Federal Circuit
for its rigid application of injunctions upon a showing of liability—its “automatic
rule”—and instead implemented what is described as “the traditional four-factor
test for injunctions.”47 The Supreme Court took issue with the Federal Circuit’s
comment that “[i]f the injunction gives the patentee additional leverage in
licensing, that is a natural consequence of the right to exclude and not an
inappropriate reward to a party that does not intend to compete in the marketplace
with potential infringers.”48 Overruling the Federal Circuit, the Court articulated a
balancing test:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may
grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered
an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.49
Although the Court repeatedly stated that neither of the lower court decisions
applied what it called the “traditional four-factor framework,” remedies scholars
have pointed out that there is no such thing as “the traditional test.”50 Before eBay,
“[r]emedies specialists had never heard of the four-point test.”51 Neither of the

43. See Klar, supra note 22, at 855 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 and Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v.
Universal Sys. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Del. 2004)).
44. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(stating that “the district court's public interest analysis should be whether there exists some
critical public interest that would be injured by the grant of preliminary relief”); Ethicon
Endo-Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500, 1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
45. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
46. See id. at 391.
47. See id. at 393–94.
48. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
49. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–
13 (1982)).
50. DOUGLAS LAYLOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 426 (4th ed. 2010) (“But there
was no ‘traditional’ four-part test.”).
51. Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007); see also John M. Golden, The Supreme
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cases cited by the Court included a four-factor test for permanent injunctions: in
Amoco, the injunction at issue was a preliminary injunction,52 and in RomeroBarcelo, while the injunction at issue was granted at the end of a complete trial, it
was only preliminary in nature.53 Indeed, while “[e]Bay and many of its amici, and
the U.S. Solicitor General, who was supporting MercExchange, all referred to some
version of four traditional considerations . . . [t]hey did not all cite the same four
factors, and none of the lead briefs offered anything so flat footed as the Court’s
formulation.”54 At least one commentator has gone as far as saying that the
“Court’s traditional four-factor test appears to have been something of a hoax.”55
Nevertheless, with respect to the public interest consideration, after eBay a
plaintiff is now required to affirmatively demonstrate each of the four factors,
meaning a plaintiff must raise and negate public interest concerns. Regardless of
whether it is a new factor required for permanent injunctions or possibly a
restatement of a traditional consideration, the public interest will clearly be a
concern going forward. In fact, following the eBay decision, district courts have
declined to issue injunctive relief in approximately one out of every four cases
where infringement has been shown.56 Left with little guidance by the Court on
how to apply this “new” factor, the application of public interest will certainly be
explored by academics and practitioners. There remains the question of when, if
ever, the public interest is sufficient to deny a patent owner its right to exclude.
B. The Public Interest in Section 337 Patent Investigations at the ITC
1. Statutory Background of the “Public Interest” Considerations
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) provides that
[i]f the Commission determines . . . that there is a violation of [the]
section, it shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded from
entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such
exclusion upon the public health and welfare . . . it finds that such
articles should not be excluded from entry.
Besides the broad and all-encompassing “public welfare,” the statute enumerates
three other, more specific, considerations: (1) “competitive conditions in the United

Court as a “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent
Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 695 (2009) (“According to at least two experts in remedies law,
there was no widespread tradition of such a test for permanent injunctions.”).
52. See Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 542.
53. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311–13.
54. LAYLOCK, supra note 50, at 427.
55. Golden, supra note 51, at 695 (discussing what Golden terms “the four-factor
mess”).
56. See Ernest Grumbles III, Rachel C. Hughey & Susan Perera, The Three Year Anniversary
of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
Nov. 2009, at 26, available at http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/articles/three-yearanniversary-eBay-MercExchange.asp.
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States economy,” (2) “the production of like or directly competitive articles in the
United States,” and (3) the “United States consumers.”57
While the Section 337 investigation originated with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act of 1930, the public interest factors were not included until the passage of the
Trade Act of 1974.58 At the time, the addition was “[p]erhaps the most novel
amendment” and “require[d] the Commission, after it has determined that a
violation does or may exist, to weigh the effect of its actions ‘upon the public
health and welfare.’”59 Discussing the inclusion of the public interest consideration
during Section 337 investigations, the Senate Committee reported:
During its investigations under section 337, the Commission would be
directed to consult with the Departments of Justice, Health, Education,
and Welfare, the Federal Trade Commission, and other government
agencies when appropriate. In making its determinations . . . the
Commission would be required to take into consideration . . . the effect
which such action would have on the general health and welfare, on
competitive conditions in the economy, on the production of like or
competitive merchandise in the United States, and on consumers. These
considerations could be overriding.60
Using similarly superlative language, the Committee further noted that it
“believe[d] that the public health and welfare and the assurance of competitive
conditions in the United States economy must be the overriding considerations in
the administration of [the] statute.”61 It stated that an exclusion order should not be
issued “in cases where there is any evidence of price gouging or monopolistic
practices in the domestic industry.”62
Since the amendment added by the Trade Act of 1974, the language of the
statute has changed very little. The Commission, however, has recently approved
new regulations governing the public interest factor of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).63

57. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006); see also Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629
F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
58. Compare Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat.
590, 703, with Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053 (1975),
and 19 U.S.C § 1337(d) (Supp. 1975). See also Harvey Kaye & Paul Plaia, Jr.,
Developments in Unfair Trade Practices in International Trade: A Review of the Third and
Fourth Years Under Section 337 as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 61 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 115 (1979).
59. Will E. Leonard & F. David Foster, The Metamorphosis of the U.S. International
Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 719, 754–55 (1976)
(noting that “[i]t is difficult to assess the significance of this factor”).
60. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 35 (1974) (emphasis added). Section 341 of the Trade Act of
1974 amended Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. A major component of the
amendments was to give the Commission itself the authority to grant exclusion orders
instead of the President. The amendment gave the Commission final authority, subject to
judicial review. § 341, 88 Stat. at 2053.
61. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197; see also id. at 193 (“The Committee feels that the
public interest must be paramount in the administration of this statute.” (emphasis added)).
62. Id. at 197.
63. See Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,803 (Oct. 19, 2011) (to
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The amendments have transitioned the consideration of the public interest from a
final, ancillary step of a Section 337 investigation to a prominent, first step in
commencing an investigation.64 The new regulations require that complainants file,
“concurrently with the complaint, a separate statement of public interest.”65 The
regulations also specify what the submission must address: (1) how the articles are
used; (2) the public health, safety, or welfare concerns; (3) the directly competitive
articles that could replace the subject articles; (4) the capacity to replace the volume
of articles subject to the requested remedial orders; and (5) the impact of exclusion
on U.S. consumers.66 Without expanding on all the changes implemented by the
new regulations, suffice it to say that 19 C.F.R. § 210 has been retooled to magnify
the scrutiny on the public interest factors under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
Practitioners and academics have taken notice.67
2. Case Examples: Four Successes, Multiple Failures
Despite the Senate Committee’s statement that the public interest “must be the
overriding consideration[] in the administration of [the] statute,”68 the ITC has been
extremely conservative in its use. In fact, the Commission has clearly stated that
“the public interest favors the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights by
excluding infringing imports”69 and has only in “rare instances declined to issue
permanent relief when the adverse effect on the public interest was greater [than]
the interest in protecting rights secured by valid patents.”70 Since the public interest
consideration was mandated in 1974, there have been only four instances where the
Commission found that the public interest required denial of an injunctive remedy.
Those cases are worth exploring to determine the outer contours of the public
interest exception as the patent bar moves forward with public interest in the
spotlight.
In Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders,71 an investigation involving the
importation of proprietary automotive crankpin grinding machines, the
Commission announced that, for “the first time,” it had “determined that the public
interest factors preclude[d] imposition of a remdy [sic].”72 After reciting the
relevant legislative history, the Commission discussed how “the availability of
crankpin grinders to Ford is a critical element in Ford’s program to meet the fuel

be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 210).
64. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.8(b) (2012).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Walters & Paulraj, supra note 21; see also Rules of Adjudication and
Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 64,803–05 (discussing the comments received by the Notice of
Proposed Rule under 75 Fed. Reg. 60671 (Oct. 1, 2010)).
68. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197 (1974).
69. Certain Two-Handle Centerset Faucets and Escutcheons, and Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-422, USITC Pub. 3332, at 9 (July 2000) (Final).
70. Certain Home Vacuum Packaging Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-496, USITC Pub. 3681,
at 3–4 (Mar. 1, 2004) (Final) (emphasis added) (internal punctuation omitted).
71. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022 (Dec.
1979) (Final).
72. Id. at 18.
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economy standards mandated by Congress.”73 A crankpin is a pivotal component in
converting linear motion from the piston into rotary motion. The crankpin grinder
is a piece of large industrial machinery, weighing nearly twenty tons, that shapes
the pins to the correct diameter and finish.74
Significantly, Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders was filed amidst the energy
crisis of 1979—a result of the Iranian Revolution.75 Oil production had been
disrupted in the Middle East, and U.S. consumers, with fresh memories of the
energy crisis of 1973,76 began to buy gasoline in a panic and prepare for gasoline
rationing.77 The court was swayed by “the fact that Congress and the
President . . . established a policy requiring automotive companies to
increase . . . fuel economy . . . and that some of these companies [were]
encountering difficulties in obtaining automatic crankpin grinders on a timely
basis.”78 Without taking the next logical step and establishing a direct correlation
between crankpin grinders and the ultimate, laudable goal of high fuel economy,
the ITC found “that the public interest considerations . . . are stronger than
complainant’s rights to enforcement of its patent monopoly.”79
Interestingly, however, “[d]espite the gas lines and the president’s warnings,
most Americans remain[ed] doubtful that there [was] a ‘real’ oil shortage stemming
from a genuine depletion of oil resources.”80 In fact, the actual oil production

73. Id. Congress had mandated higher efficiency cars under the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards of 1975, and it was the first time fuel economy regulations were
imposed on passenger cars—for example, 18.0 miles per gallon by 1978. See Energy Policy
and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (establishing the CAFE
standards); see also, e.g., Roger H. Bezdek & Robert M. Wendling, Fuel Efficiency and the
Economy, 93 AM. SCIENTIST 132, 132 (2005).
74. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 6,
15 (Dec. 1979) (Final).
75. See JOHN D. STEMPEL, INSIDE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 165–94, 317–18 (1981);
HEATHER LEHR WAGNER, MILESTONES IN MODERN WORLD HISTORY: THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTION 63–75 (2010) (“By December 1978, the violence in Iran seemed out of
control.”).
76. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1973 OIL EMBARGO: ENERGY
TRENDS SINCE THE FIRST MAJOR U.S. ENERGY CRISIS 1 (1998) (stating that “[t]he 1973 Arab
Oil Embargo was the first oil supply disruption to cause major price increases and a
worldwide energy crisis” and that “[v]irtually all spare oil production capacity was in the
Middle East when the Arab Oil Embargo began in October 1973” while also providing
excellent graphical representations of energy trends over the past several decades); see also
ROBERT E. HUNTER, THE ENERGY ‘CRISIS’ AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 3 (1973) (“Since 1972,
concern has been growing . . . about an impending energy ‘crisis.’ This concern was
dramatized by the shortage of fuel oil in the Eastern and Middle Western states during the
winter of 1972-73 . . . .”).
77. See, e.g., DAVID T. HARTGEN, ALFRED J. NEVEU, JOANNA M. BRUNSO, JOHN S.
BANAS & JEANMARIE MILLER, CHANGES IN TRAVEL IN RESPONSE TO THE 1979 ENERGY CRISIS
(1979).
78. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 20
(Dec. 1979) (Final).
79. Id. at 20–21.
80. Al Richman, The Polls: Public Attitudes Toward the Energy Crisis, 43 PUB. OPINION
Q. 576, 576 (1979); see also Peter Deutsch, The Phony Oil Crisis, 228 NATION 423 (1979);
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statistics show that much of the crisis was really just an “onslaught of crisis
propaganda manufactured by the Department of Energy in order to make way for
oil price decontrol and relaxation of environmental protections laws”81 that
allegedly served to benefit mainly large oil corporations like Exxon Corporation.82
The “Big Three” American car manufacturers were, in reality, struggling to
compete in a market with new compact Japanese and Chinese cars.83 American car
manufactures like Ford and General Motors were in a crisis of their own, failing to
produce profitable cars on a timely basis—a problem separate from their ability to
meet congressional demands on fuel efficiency.84 The true public interest may very
well have been the value of having successful (that is, profitable) American car
manufacturers and American oil companies, not the public’s interest in fuelefficient cars.85 As one dissenting commissioner stated, the case was not one of
price gouging or monopolistic prices, as discussed by Congress in the legislative
history of the Trade Act of 1974.86 In fact, the complainant’s prices were actually
lower than the prices of the imported grinder.87

David Popp, Induced Innovation and Energy Prices, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 160 (2002); Philip
K. Verleger, Jr., The U.S. Petroleum Crisis of 1979, 1979 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 463.
81. Deutsch, supra note 80, at 423; see also ANTONY C. SUTTON, ENERGY: THE CREATED
CRISIS 119, 137, 145–47 (1979) (arguing that the energy crisis was a “delusion”
manufactured by Washington bureaucrats and that the framework for the “created crisis” was
established long before 1979).
82. Deutsch, supra note 80, at 425. “Once again it appears that there is no significant
shortage and that the oil companies and the Energy Department are working together to take
full advantage of a political situation.” Id. at 426 (emphasis added); see also SUTTON, supra
note 81.
83. See Howard Geller, Philip Harrington, Arthur H. Rosenfeld, Satoshi Tanishima &
Fridtjof Unander, Polices for Increasing Energy Efficiency: Thirty Years of Experience in
OECD Countries, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 556, 561 (2006) (discussing how the Japanese, among
other Asian nations, had instituted energy-efficient research and development schemes and
legal policies in the early 1970s); Young-suk Hyun & Jinjoo Lee, Can Hyundai Go It
Alone?, 22 LONG RANGE PLAN. 63 (1989).
84. See Carol A. MacLennan, Political Response to Economic Loss: The Automotive
Crisis Of 1979-1982, 14 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY & STUD. CULTURAL SYS. & WORLD ECON.
DEV. 21, 25–27 (1985) (discussing the economic turmoil of domestic auto manufacturers);
see also ALAN ALTSHULER, MARTIN ANDERSON, DANIEL JONES, DANIEL ROOS & JAMES
WOMACK, THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE: THE REPORT OF MIT’S INTERNAL AUTOMOBILE
PROGRAM vii (1986) (“[T]he world economy was entering the worst economic downturn
since the Great Depression, and the auto industry was among the hardest-hit sectors.”).
85. Interestingly, only four parties even filed statements weighing in on the public
interest factors prior to the October 29, 1979 hearing: two government agencies (which had
no advice), General Motors Corporation, and Caterpillar Tractor Company. See Certain
Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 4–5 (Dec. 1979)
(Final).
86. See id. at 1 (Comm. Moore’s supplemental views); S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 21
(1974).
87. See Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022,
at 1 (Dec. 1979) (Final) (Comm. Moore’s supplemental views) (warning that “[a] patent is a
constitutionally granted monopoly”).
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One year after Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the Commission once
again found that public interest factors trumped the property right of a patent holder
in Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes.88 The infringing accelerator tubes
were being used by several universities to study nuclear structure and were
allegedly “greatly superior in performance” to others in the market.89 The
Commission found “that basic scientific research, such as . . . nuclear structure
research . . . is precisely the kind of activity intended by Congress to be included
when it required the Commission to consider . . . the public health and welfare.”90
Like Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, this case arose against a unique
political backdrop: the Cold War91 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.92 In
1979, the United States was re-engaged in a nuclear arms race, stationing
intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe93 and developing a confrontational
policy that later became known as the Strategic Defense Initiative.94
The Commission performed a balancing test that weighed the “impact of a
remedy on users of the imported device versus the impact of the violation on the
owner of the patent.”95 Without significant justification, the Commission stated that
it believed that researchers “are not motivated solely by expectation of a profit in
the way that holders of more conventional product and process patents are.”96 The
Commission insinuated that the property right conferred by a patent is merely a
conduit for profit and that where profits are not a motivation, the patent right is
otherwise free to be derogated. It stated that its determination “denies part of the
rewards of having conducted that research in the past, but broadens the benefit to
the public now by permitting research with a wider range of devices.”97 Under such
logic, any patent right that could be useful to basic research, if left unenforced,
might fail the public interest balancing test.

88. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (Dec. 1980) (Final).
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 22.
91. See generally MATTHEW FARISH, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICA’S COLD WAR (2010);
RICHARD SMOKE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE COLD WAR (3d ed. 1993).
92. See M. HASSAN KAKAR, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND THE AFGHAN
RESPONSE, 1979-1982, at 1–17 (1995).
93. SMOKE, supra note 91.
94. The Initiative was prompted by President Ronald Reagan’s 1979 visit to the
NORAD command base under Cheyenne Mountain and new developments in nuclear
weaponry, such as the x-ray laser invented by the fabled “O Group.” See, e.g., REBECCA S.
BJORK, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: THE SYMBOLIC CONTAINMENT OF THE NUCLEAR
THREAT 12–17 (1992); JOHN A. JUNGERMAN, UNIV. CAL. INST. ON GLOBAL CONFLICT &
COOPERATION, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: A PRIMER AND CRITIQUE (1998).
95. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119,
at 29 (Dec. 1980) (Final).
96. Id. at 31.
97. Id.
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Four years later, the Commission again denied relief in light of the public
interest in a case captioned Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus.98 The
Commission determined it was not in the public interest to exclude the importation
of specialized hospital beds for burn patients where the complainant could not meet
the demand and where no comparable substitute was available.99 In its brief
opinion, the Commission focused on the ability of the complainant to meet the
production and distribution needs of the public in the “expanding market” for
specialized burn beds.100 The Commission ultimately agreed with the
administrative law judge that “if a temporary exclusion order were issued some
patients might not have access to burn beds at all in the interim period.”101 In other
words, because the complainant’s own industry and invention, leading to its grant
of a patent, created a successful and expanding market where there had once been
none, the public interest now trumped the exclusionary rights responsible for the
market in the first place. The opinion provides an unsatisfying and circular
justification for eviscerating a constitutionally granted property right, even if only
dealing with a temporary exclusion order.
In 2011, the Commission issued a fourth opinion in which it found that the
public interest demanded that certain infringing 3G handheld wireless
communication devices, such as mobile phones and PDAs, that were “previously
imported” were exempt from the exclusion order.102 In Certain Baseband
Processor Chips,103 Broadcomm sued Qualcomm for importing patent-infringing
wireless communication device patents that had implications for the 3G networks
throughout the entire country.104 In particular, “first responders”105 throughout the
nation testified to the adverse effect that exclusion would have on their ability to
protect the public in case of an emergency because they relied heavily on GPS
positioning systems and the ED-VO infrastructure generally.106
Artfully noting that “we do not accept the general proposition that, if the
infringing activity is great enough, the public interest forbids a remedy,” the
Commission structured relief that “ha[d] a much more limited impact on
availability of 3G-capable handsets, and thus a lesser impact on the public
interest.”107 Unlike the earlier cases, the Commission developed a detailed opinion

98. Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-182/188, USITC Pub. 1667 (Oct. 1984) (Final).
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id. at 20.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Prods. Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone
Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 3 (Oct. 2011) (Final). [hereinafter
“Certain Baseband Processor Chips”].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. “First responders” refers to emergency personnel who arrive first at the scene of
an accident and those in the first response chain of information, such as dispatchers.
106. Id. ED-VO is a complex telecommunications standard for wireless data
transmissions through radio signals that involves multiplexing techniques to optimize data
throughput.
107. Id. at 153 (structuring a “grandfathering” exception for those devices that had
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and recognized Senate testimony regarding the fundamental nature of patent
rights108 that had become oft-cited rhetoric in ITC opinions.109 When deciding to
limit Broadcomm’s relief, the Commission in Certain Baseband Processor Chips at
least outwardly recognized that “[t]he importation of any infringing merchandise
derogates from the statutory right, diminishes the value of the intellectual property,
and thus indirectly harms the public interest.”110 Presumably, the Commission also
internalized111 the fundamental nature of patents as a property right articulated in its
opinion.
Apart from these four examples, in the vast majority of cases, the public interest
was either not considered or found not to trump the interest of having strong
intellectual property rights. In particular, and notably, the Commission has
repeatedly found that evidence that an exclusion order could lead to higher prices is
not dispositive of the public interest.112 This was true even in Certain Crystalline
Cefadroxil Monohydrate,113 where a pharmaceutical grade oral antibiotic was in
dispute.114 The Commission held the public interest did not support denying an
exclusion order that would lead to higher pharmaceutical drug prices.115

already been imported).
108. The Senate stated:
The owner of intellectual property has been granted a temporary statutory right
to exclude others from making, using or selling the protected property. The
purpose of such temporary protection, which is provided for in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, is “to promote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” In return for
temporary protection, the owner agrees to make public the intellectual property
in question. This trade-off creates a public interest in the enforcement of
protected intellectual property rights. Any sale in the United States of a product
covered by an intellectual property right is a sale that rightfully belongs only to
the holder or licensee of that property. The importation of any infringing
merchandise derogates from the statutory right, diminishes the value of the
intellectual property, and thus indirectly harms the public interest.
S. REP NO. 100-71 at 128–29 (1987) (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Certain Elec. Connectors and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA374, USITC Pub. 2981, at 19 (July 1996) (“First, the public interest favors the protection of
U.S. intellectual property rights.”); Certain Power Supply Controllers and Prods. Containing
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-541, USITC Pub. 3993, at 10 (May 2008) (Final).
110. Certain Baseband Processor Chips, No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 64 n.231
(Oct. 2011) (Final) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-71 at 128–29 (1987)).
111. “Internalization” here refers to the sociological and psychological meaning of the
term regarding the process of accepting norms, instead of the economic meaning.
112. See, e.g., Certain Auto. Parts, Inv. No. 337-TA-557, USITC Pub. 4012, (June 2008)
(Final).
113. Inv. No. 337-TA-293, USITC Pub. 2391 (June 1991).
114. Id. (finding that the public interest did not support denying an exclusion order that
would lead to higher drug prices for the oral antibiotic in dispute).
115. Id.

1062

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1047

II. JUSTIFYING PATENTS AS RIGHTS
In his most recent book, Professor Robert Merges points out the need to “notice”
the shift from regarding intellectual property as a system of social utility to one of
fundamental rights.116 He makes an astute observation that is easily overlooked—
that “courts often wind up talking about IP rights as rights,” but are often too busy
“to notice the significance of this move.”117 The truth of Merges’s observation can
be seen in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s recent opinion in
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.118 Judge O’Malley, discussing
post-eBay injunctions, wrote: “[E]ven though a successful patent infringement
plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request
for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the
fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to
exclude.”119 In other words, the courts once again spoke directly about intellectual
property as a fundamental right—a genuine right to exclude—but left the reader
without any substantive guidance about the true foundation or implications of such
a statement.
The same is true for cases at the ITC. As can be seen from the four cases in
which the use of “public interest” factors were found to outweigh the exclusion
privileges conferred by a valid patent to its owner, the ITC often uses the term
“patent right” in the same offhand manner that concerned Merges about intellectual
property generally. For example, in Certain Home Vacuum Packing Products, a
case where public interest did not prevail over the patent, the Commission stated
simply that there is an “interest in protecting rights secured by valid patents”120 and
in Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, a case where public interest won out, the
Commission again merely tossed out the notion of a “complainant’s rights to
enforcement.”121 More recently, the Commission has relied on language from
Congress discussing a patentee’s “temporary statutory right to exclude others” in
regards to the Intellectual Property Clause.122
In light of the development of the ITC as an intellectual property forum123 and
the obvious implications of new rules regarding the public interest consideration of
Section 337,124 it is helpful to use Merges’s framework as a set of directional

116. MERGES, supra note 28, at 3.
117. Id. (emphasis in original).
118. 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
119. Id. at 1149 (emphasis added).
120. Inv. No. 337-TA-496, USITC Pub. No. 3681, at 17 (Mar. 2004) (Final) (emphasis
added).
121. Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. No. 1022, at 21 (Dec. 1979) (Final).
122. See Certain Baseband Processor Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. No.
4258, at 65 (Oct. 2011) (citing S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 128–29 (1987)) (“The purpose of such
temporary protection, which is provided for in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United
States Constitution, is ‘to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for
limited Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.’”).
123. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 24; Brevetti, supra note 24.
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beacons where “public interest” can too easily become victim to subjective
applications.125 Since Merges states that “theory at this [high] level can only point
us to general considerations, [and] can only help restructure the issues in a way that
gives us some insight into the deeper principles at stake in a specific dispute,” it is
valuable to focus it and compress it further.126
A. The Justifying Intellectual Property Foundational Framework
Merges’s foundational framework for justifying intellectual property is based on
the blended philosophical theories of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John
Rawls.127 These three philosophers espouse beliefs that seek to explain the nature
and utility of property conventions. Professor Merges argues that a new framework
of justification is needed because the “[c]urrent convention . . . that IP law seeks to
maximize the net social benefit of the practices it regulates” is “[i]mpossibly
complex” and “will always be at best aspirational.”128 Utilitarian formulation, from
Merges’s perspective, will never provide a “lock-solid, airtight case, a case we can
confidently take to an unbiased jury of hardheaded social scientists.”129 Instead,
Merges advocates a theory of intellectual property derived from “a much richer,
more complex, at times more confounding understanding of what property is all
about.”130 Particularly relevant to the idea of public interest in patent law is that this
theory would replace the always-subjective utilitarian balancing factors with
nonutilitarian normative conceptions of patent law—fundamentally changing the
analysis of when public interest trumps a patent, as a right.
1. John Locke
There is an expansive body of work directed to the works of John Locke.
Lockean principles are many; they are widely known, and they are the subject of
voluminous commentary. The notion that Merges’s theory is extensive enough to
encapsulate and utilize the entire labyrinth of Locke’s work would be foolish; more
importantly, it would be entirely unhelpful to the pursuit of justifying a system of
intellectual property using nonutilitarian foundations because it would be
unworkable. Much of the value in Merges’s work lies in what he chooses to
emphasize. In a similar fashion, Merges’s entire discussion of Lockean principles
would not be helpful to the question of using the public interest as a way to deny

125. See Italo H. Ablondi & H. Henning Vent, Section 337 Import Investigations—Unfair
Import Practices, 4 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 27, 35 n.57 (1981) (“One issue raised is
the extent to which the Commission’s consideration of public policy factors should reflect a
developed adjudicative record at the risk of being found arbitrary.”).
126. MERGES, supra note 28, at 308.
127. Id. at 305.
128. Id. at 2–3 (“Estimating costs and benefits, modeling them over time, projecting what
would happen under counterfactuals (such as how many novels or pop songs really would be
written in the absence of copyright protection, and who would benefit from such a
situation)—these are all overwhelmingly complicated tasks.”).
129. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
130. Id. at 13.
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patent owners the ability to exclude others from making, using, or selling their
patent property. As such, this Article will reflect upon only the essentials of the
discussion.
Merges starts with Locke’s “labor theory” of appropriation: labor as a
justification for property rights. The theory is derived from Section 27 of Locke’s
Second Treatise on Government, which now enjoys fabled notoriety.131 The
operative phrase from the lengthy passage is “[w]hatsoever then he removes out of
the State that Nature hath provided . . . he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.”132 From this
phrase the notion of mixing one’s labor with things from nature to create dominion
over the thing is derived. Merges seems to avoid the notion of mixing, however,
instead focusing on the expenditure of effort: “individual appropriation comes
about through effort.”133 This type of appropriation is appropriate, in Locke’s view,
under both theological (i.e., divine directives) and a mix of nontheological
reasoning.134
Locke’s theory of “one-to-one mapping between individual people and discrete
economic resources”135 is directly applicable to intellectual property, and
particularly applicable for patents. From this Author’s perspective, Locke’s notion
of nature as an enormous realm of common resources parallels the idea of the
universe of prior art136 often utilized by patent scholars. One way to determine
obviousness137 in patent law is to think of the person having ordinary skill in the
art138 (“PHOSITA”) standing in a workshop with the entire relevant prior art before
him and then to decide whether it would have been obvious for the PHOSITA to
create the claimed invention. From such a specific patent law example, not
considered directly by Merges, it is easy to expand on Merges’s belief that “[t]he

131. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
132. Id. at 288.
133. MERGES, supra note 28, at 35.
134. Id. at 34.
135. Id.
136. Prior art is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2006) as inventions “known or used
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country” and things “described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States.” Prior art is considered to be art that is contained in the public
domain and accessible. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“‘[P]ublic
accessibility’ . . . [is] the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed
publication’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”).
137. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”).
138. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141.03 (8th ed. 2001, rev. vol.
2012) (“The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to
have known the relevant art at the time of the invention.”).
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stock of public domain information, from which individual creators draw, fits
closely with Locke’s conception of a vast realm of common resources.”139
Running with the idea of the “universe of prior art” and an obviousness
determination discussed above, Locke’s theory of labor being mixed with nature
also matches well with intellectual types of property—specifically with patents. For
example, discussing intellectual property rights generally, Merges states that “some
well-known doctrines in IP law provide that ‘mere’ labor (or hard work) is not
always enough to establish an IPR, nontrivial creations presumably requiring
significant effort are often said to be at the heart of IP law.”140 While not
specifically mentioned, Section 103 obviousness is an example of one such
intellectual property doctrine. The obviousness doctrine is, in some regards, a
measure of expenditure of labor or ingenuity; the patent laws do not reward merely
trivial or obvious progression in the arts and sciences. Merges teases from Locke’s
works a similar “proportionality principle”141 that correlates the effort expended in
labor with the bounds of property rights.142
An important aspect of Locke’s philosophy that Merges adopts is that of
“human prospering through individual appropriation.”143 In Locke’s world, “the
passion for material appropriation is viewed as fundamental, even primary, in
motivating the creation acts of the individual.”144 Or, as Merges phrases it: “Few
would bother laboring to recast, reshape, or improve [materials they find in their
environment] if that work had to be shared with all comers.”145 Merges’s
framework, at its heart, requires a belief that endeavoring to create and to make

139. MERGES, supra note 28, at 33.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 159–91. In chapter six of Justifying Intellectual Property, Merges explores
what he terms “The Proportionality Principle” and emphasizes its importance above other
principles that he espouses throughout the book. Id. at 159. In that chapter the eBay case is
discussed at length and the concept of undue leverage plays prominently. See id. at 165–91.
142. Locke also directly states: “The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give
us Property, does also bound that Property too.” JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY:
JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 121 (1980) (emphasis in original) (quoting LOCKE, supra
note 131, at 290); see also KIRSTIE M. MCCLURE, JUDGING RIGHTS: LOCKEAN POLITICS AND
THE LIMITS OF CONSENT 87 (1996) (“In most of his treatment of the property right
appropriate to human agents in the state of nature, Locke continues to articulate this
harmonious relationship between law and rights in constructions that consistently imply the
boundedness of property right by considerations of proper use.”).
143. MERGES, supra note 28, at 38. Merges focuses on the idea that “[t]he need to survive
and thrive . . . justifies removal from nature.” Id. at 41. It is also the focus on labor as an
“extra force” or an “external manifestation of a person’s self” that separates and clarifies
Merges’s framework from a plain reading of Locke’s “mixing” metaphor that might allow
claims to property where Merges would find such claims undeserving. Id. at 42–44; see also
id. at 46 (discussing the Nozick-Waldron hypothetical stating that “[t]hey take us away from
the things Locke was centrally concerned with, human flourishing and the role of labor”).
144. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY 25 (2010) (quoting Sibyl
Schwarzenbach, Locke’s Two Conceptions of Property, 14 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 141, 157
(1988)).
145. MERGES, supra note 28, at 37.
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useful things is fundamental to the purpose of life, similar to Locke’s divine
directive,146 and that such a quest requires labor.147
To Merges, as important as Locke’s “labor theory” of appropriation or initial
grant of property are three of Locke’s so-called “provisos.” Merges perceives the
provisos as “limiting, cabining elements even within [Locke’s] theory of initial
appropriation.”148 In that regard, the provisos are vital to an understanding of how
public interest factors may be used in patent litigation to justly limit a patent
owner’s right to exclude. The three provisos are (1) the sufficiency proviso,149 (2)
the spoliation or waste proviso,150 and (3) the charity proviso.151
Unlike some other scholars,152 Merges views the sufficiency proviso and the
spoliation proviso as two separate requirements. Where others might view the
spoliation requirement as subsumed in the sufficiency proviso, under Merges’s
framework it is possible to “take objects from the common[s], leaving ‘enough, and
as good’ for others, and yet allow those objects to spoil” or go to waste.153 While
logic might suggest that the type of appropriation that meets the sufficiency
condition is necessarily modest and, therefore, not wasteful, Merges believes that
Locke would have seen any spoilage as an “intrinsic affront to nature” even where
the appropriator was mindful of others.154 Thus, under this model, one may not
have a justifiable, legitimate claim of appropriation without avoiding both the
spoilage and sufficiency conditions. These conditions play prominently in an
understanding of when, under a nonutilitarian model for intellectual property such
as Merges’s, the public interest overcomes an alleged property right.
Merges provides a few helpful insights into what situations might constitute a
violation of the provisos—including several that bear directly on fact patterns
found in the ITC cases where public interests overcame patent rights.155 First, with

146. Usefulness is a critical aspect for Merges. See id. at 47.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 48.
149. See LOCKE, supra note 131, at 288 (“For this Labour being the unquestionable
Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at
least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” (second emphasis
added)).
150. See LOCKE, supra note 131, at 290 (“But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may
by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs
to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.” (second emphasis added)).
151. See LOCKE, supra note 131, at 170 (“God the Lord and Father of all, has given no
one of his Children such a Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of this World, but
that he has given his needy Brother a Right to the Surplusage of his Goods; so that it cannot
justly be denyed him, when his pressing Wants call for it. And therefore no Man could ever
have a just Power over the Life of another by Right of property in Land or Possessions; since
[it would] always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for want of
affording him Relief out of his Plenty.” (emphasis added)).
152. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Enough and as Good Left for Others, 29 PHIL. Q. 319
(1979).
153. MERGES, supra note 28, at 51.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part I.B.2.
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regard to sufficiency, is the problem of reliance. Discussing the scholarship of
Wendy Gordon, Merges notes that “[a]n original creator can add something that
others come to depend on in an important way” and that “if that creator tries to
remove what he or she has added, people may experience an important loss.”156
Merges recognizes the merit of Gordon’s reliance arguments; he is aware that it is
possible to make people worse off by exposing them to a massive influx of culture,
only to have it removed by expansive intellectual property rights. Importantly,
however, under his framework it is ultimately recognized that “[m]ost contributions
to culture are . . . like isolated drops in [a] lake” and removing them “would barely
cause a ripple.”157 It is truly the rare, canonical invention that changes the
baseline158—most everything in the realm of intellectual property usually meets the
sufficiency condition.159 Additionally, the reliance aspect of the sufficiency proviso
comes into play at the postgrant stage of property rights, and seems to fit better
with Merges’s conception of proportionality, discussed below.
Second, with regards to spoliation, Merges takes a strict view on what
constitutes spoliation. Merges interprets Locke as requiring appropriation followed
by no productive use at all—“not unsatisfied demand.”160 Merges goes further,
stating: “It follows that only someone who never embodies it in any tangible
medium at all, or who embodies a rough version of it in a single prototype and just
lets it sit somewhere, unused, has engaged in Lockean spoliation.”161 Simply put: a
very difficult standard to achieve.
Finally, with regard to the third proviso, the charity proviso, Merges calls
particular attention to the literal language of Locke’s First Treatise.162 The relevant
passage states that “no Man could ever have a just Power over the Life of another,
by Right of property” and that no man is “to let his Brother perish for want of
affording him Relief out of his Plenty.”163 Like the spoilage proviso, this too is
strictly construed by Merges. Essentially, Merges draws a line between “basic
human sustenance,” those things that might otherwise literally lead “to let [a]
brother perish,” like life-saving drugs, and “cultural development,” those things
that simply lead to types of “human flourishing and development.”164 Under his

156. MERGES, supra note 28, at 52; see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533, 1567 (1993) (“[O]nce a creator exposes her intellectual property to the
public, and that product influences the stream of culture and events, excluding the public
from access to it can harm.”). “The creator’s contribution adds so significantly to what was
there that it is wrong to permit the creator to pull back what he or she contributed, to remove
it from circulation.” MERGES, supra note 28, at 53.
157. MERGES, supra note 28, at 55.
158. Id. at 52–53.
159. Id. at 55 (“First Amendment principles, IP doctrine, self-interest, and enforcement
costs all conspire to make it difficult and unprofitable to overenforce IP rights, thereby
pulling a protected work back from public accessibility.”).
160. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 58; see also id. at 61 (“Locke [was] concerned with abject waste.”).
162. LOCKE, supra note 131.
163. Id. at 170.
164. MERGES, supra note 28, at 64–65 (“[I]n my view IP rights are limited only in actual
cases where IP is enforced in a way that interferes with sustenance or survival.” (emphasis
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framework, only where intellectual property enforcement practices actually lead to
situations of life and death would the charity proviso come into play with regard to
patent rights.165
In summary, Merges's framework utilizes notions of Lockean appropriation
wherein things are “pluck[ed] . . . out of the found environment and
[brought] . . . into a more personal zone, where they can be of use to the individual”
in a manner that required expenditure of labor.166 This is the basis of the initial
appropriation of an intellectual property right, but Merges also recognizes that the
rights of the appropriator are not unbounded and turns to three provisos for those
limits.167 While the provisos might be read broadly by some, under Merges’s model
they “lead a mostly closeted existence” with regards to intellectual property and are
not often justifiably invoked.168
2. Immanuel Kant
Departing from seventeenth century theories of natural law, Merges brings into
his framework the observational moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant on
property.169 With Kant, the focus is on the individual, on autonomy: “To make full
use of things, to impose their will on things and thereby do the sorts of projects
they need to do, people must be free to use all sorts of objects in all sorts of
ways.”170 It is morally justifiable, in the abstract, for individuals to control objects
that further their plans, goals, and free will. Unlike his contemporaries, Kant’s
conception of a property system starts with the individual—an individual’s need to
control and impart his or her own free will is the impetus for the need for a system
of property.171 In other words, it is the individual’s act of free will that leads to
social institutions that follow, not the other way around.172 From Kant’s
perspective, in order to expand their range of freedom—that is, their autonomy—
people eventually agree to what Merges calls a system of “Mine and Yours.”173

added)).
165. Merges, however, remarks how well Locke’s charity proviso maps onto
contemporary policy debates, and in particular patents on life-saving pharmaceutical patents.
Id. at 65, 67.
166. Id. at 67.
167. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 148.
168. MERGES, supra note 28, at 66 (“Like a rare comet, they will be sighted every now
and again, but they are not a steady and constant feature of the legal constellation.”).
169. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), reprinted in
IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor, ed., trans., 1996); see also Brian
Tierney, Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant, 62 J. HIST. IDEAS 381
(2001).
170. MERGES, supra note 28, at 70.
171. Id. at 71.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 72; see also KANT, supra note 169, at 401 (“That is rightfully mine (meum
iuris) with which I am so connected that another’s use of it without my consent would wrong
me.”) (emphasis in original); B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF
RIGHT: A COMMENTARY 94 (2010) (“The basis for extending our external freedom to include
what Kant calls the ‘external mine and thine’ is the permissive law of practical reason.”).
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Merges points out that Kant’s conceptualization is uniquely applicable to
intellectual property and is just the sort of formulation that, in regards to
intellectual property, sweeps up what Locke may have left behind. Because Kant
focuses on the individual, “[t]he medium is not the message.”174 Merges argues that
by departing from a central focus on the object, Kant’s formulation more
satisfactorily justifies possession of intangible media—property of the digital
age.175 This change in perspective, which stands in contrast to Locke’s and
economics’ theory of property, acts as an excellent supplemental layer to the
understanding of what is appropriately acquired ab initio:
The principle of external Acquisition, then, may be expressed thus:
“Whatever I bring under my power according to the Law of external
Freedom, of which as an object of my free activity of Will I have the
capability of making use according to the Postulate of the Practical
Reason, and which I will to become mine in conformity with the Idea
of a possible united common Will, is mine.”176
This formulation, from Merges’s perspective, “gives human will the broadest
possible canvas on which to operate.”177 Furthermore, and important to Merges, is
that this open notion of property based on autonomy interests extends to things like
plans to make a living and reputation. Kant’s system of property encourages “an
expansive sense of the creator’s autonomy.”178
As one might predict, to be a workable theory of property rights, Kant’s
philosophy, like Locke’s, is also bounded. The doctrines that limit Kant’s
expansive canvas are where the value of his philosophy lies with regard to thinking
about the public interest factors in patent law. There are two doctrines that Merges
explores that are particularly relevant. First is the notion of waiver, or the process
wherein an appropriator of an object disclaims his or her individual possessory
rights. Second, and most importantly, is Kant’s famous Universal Principle of
Right (UPR).179
Merges describes “waiver” as “the right to voluntarily surrender . . . property
rights in something one owns.”180 Without the concept of waiver, a property right
necessarily carries with it a duty to maximally enforce the rights—an obligation to
improve oneself via the object of the appropriation. The key concept for Kant—and

174. MERGES, supra note 28, at 74 (emphasis in original).
175. Id. at 76–77 (“Property is not just a matter of physical contact between person and
object; it describes a relationship that is deeper and goes well beyond the basic acts of
grasping and holding.”).
176. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 82 (W. Hastie Trans., 1887)
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
177. MERGES, supra note 28, at 80.
178. Id. at 81.
179. KANT, supra note 176, at 46 (Chapter entitled “Universal Principle of Right”) (“The
universal Law of Right may then be expressed, thus: ‘Act externally in such a manner that
the free exercise of thy Will may be able to co-exist with the Freedom of all others,
according to a universal Law.’”).
180. MERGES, supra note 28, at 84.
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Merges—is that the grant of a property right is separate from enforcement of that
right: “Enforcement is a matter to be decided not by the state but by individual
rightholders.”181 Waiver is important conceptually because it gives property owners
an important option not to enforce their rights and therefore share with others the
stepping-stones of their autonomous plan to “do the sorts of projects they need to
do.”182
This doctrine aligns well with American patent law’s development of patent
rights without a duty to work the patented invention.183 Like Merges’s
interpretation of Kant’s conception, the U.S. Supreme Court in Continental Paper
Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.184 “rejected the argument that a patent should be
unenforceable because the patentee was not using the patented [technology] and
was also continuing to exclude competitors from using the [technology].”185 The
Court held that “such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the
right conferred by the patent” and that “it is the privilege of any owner of property
to use or not to use it, without question of motive.”186 As Merges’s philosophical
framework adopts Kant’s notion of waiver, it supports the direction of American
patent law and represents another key element to understanding when the public
interest is or is not justifiable. As with waiver, it is up to the individual property
owner to give up his or her rights, not the state.187
The UPR, the true limiting principle of Kant’s theory on property rights, states
that “rightful individual action must accord with rational, universal principles of
right and wrong.”188 Merges’s interpretation of the UPR is that “property rights
must be granted, because they are necessary to enhance human freedom,” but the
rights are constrained and “must not be so broad that they interfere with the
freedom of fellow citizens.”189 More so than Locke’s provisos, Kant’s UPR is
broad and encompassing—it contemplates a much larger universe of constraints
and brings in notions of equality and justice.190

181. Id. at 85.
182. Id. at 70.
183. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent
to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 398 (2002) (“Consistent with
historical antecedents that the patentee must work the patent to maintain its validity, in a few
early decisions, federal courts attempted to precondition an infringement remedy on the
patentee’s use of the patent.”) (footnote omitted) (citing Adam Mosoff, Rethinking the
Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1278
(2001)).
184. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
185. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1260 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing Continental Paper Bag).
186. Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 429; see also MERGES, supra note 28, at 87
(“But waiver ought to be a strictly voluntary measure.”).
187. MERGES, supra note 28, at 87 (“Autonomy has to include the right to enforce one’s
rights, or it is just a sham.”).
188. Id. at 89.
189. Id. at 90 (“[P]roperty . . . is both necessary and necessarily restricted.”).
190. See id. (“This is because Locke would limit appropriation only when it affects
others’ opportunities for appropriation.”).
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Merges is attracted to Kant’s restrictions because they straddle a world of
conventional natural law, where intellectual property rights precede the formation
of civil society or state, and conventional utilitarian calculus, where intellectual
property rights are mere creatures of state discretion. The UPR is brilliant as
applied to intellectual property because it allows intellectual property rights to
remain fundamental rights while simultaneously allowing for state discretion to
impose limits (as long as it does not derogate the fundamental right to appropriate
intellectual property). This is because, in Kant’s conception of the property right,
the state institutions that implement a property regime come after the individual’s
need to appropriate (i.e., Kant’s progression: (1) the individual’s need, (2) the state
institutions, and (3) the existence of property as a right). Kant’s logic allows state
intermingling because it is not until the state acts that the system of property rights
comes into existence. As Merges states, “IP rights are fundamental, but . . . they
also of necessity must account for the needs and rights of others, because they are
the product of an idealized set of social conventions.”191
Summarizing, the major contribution from Kantian philosophy to Merges’s
framework for justifying intellectual property is the conceptualization of
intellectual property as a fundamental right. This move allows Merges to keep
Lockean understandings of appropriation through labor—a meatier, more
comprehensible vehicle for understanding the initial property grant—but to discard
some of the Lockean notions of pure natural right, absent government. In turn, the
UPR then softens the hard edges of the Lockean provisos, providing a more
expansive, cushioned safety net for notions of equality and justice that Locke’s
model does not quite adopt.
3. John Rawls
The third and final component of Merges’s foundation of his framework is John
Rawls’s distributive justice theories, which clarify many of the Kantian notions of
equality and justice and launch them into the twentieth century.192 The most
important aspect of adding distributive justice models to the framework is to push
the limits on property rights a little further past the boundaries established by the
Lockean provisos and Kant’s UPR. The transition from Locke and Kant into a
world of distributive justice, however, is far from smooth and, in the Author’s
view, fundamentally clashes with the framework’s reliance on intellectual property
as a fundamental right. In Rawls’s world, egalitarian fairness is of first priority and
any system of property right is merely residue.193 Nonetheless, it is important to the
viability of Merges’s framework to at least attempt to traverse the question of
whether property in and of itself is fair. As Merges puts it: “the relevant
question . . . is whether IP rights have a place in a society that aspires to a fair
distribution of wealth.”194

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
Id. at 101, 104.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 103.
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Rawls presents two principles of justice that help determine whether society is
fair and just. In relevant portion, Rawls states that: (1) “[e]ach person [should] have
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar system of liberty for all,” and (2) “economic inequalities [should] be
arranged . . . to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.”195 Looking to the
fairness of property specifically, Rawls, unlike Locke and Kant, defines personal
property narrowly and constrictively. Rawls includes only those things that are
absolutely essential to an “effective private, personal sphere”196:
[A]mong the basic liberties of the person is the right to hold and to have
the exclusive use of personal property. The role of this liberty is to
allow a sufficient material basis for a sense of personal independence
and self-respect, both of which are essential for the development and
exercise of the moral powers.197
Rawls goes on to specifically warn against a Lockean conception of property where
basic rights include ownership over “means of production and natural resources”
and also against other “wider conceptions.”198 Wider conceptions of property
rights, Rawls argues, are not workable in a distributive model because such rights
are decided after “society’s circumstances and historical traditions [are]
available.”199
Rawls’s mention of “society’s circumstances and historical traditions” is a
reference to his overarching theory of political liberalism in which all societal
choices must be made in an “original position,”200 where no one knows how life’s
dice will be cast. That is, in Rawls’s hypothetical “original position,” all decisions
about how a society should be structured and how it should function are made in a
vacuum or a “veil of ignorance”201—one in which those deciding don’t know
anything about their future cultural or societal status. Therefore, in order for
intellectual property to be considered a right in Rawls’s perspective, Merges must
“show that reasonable people who were setting up a social and economic system
would agree to establish an intellectual property system as a matter of right.”202 In a
world where intellectual property ownership likely benefits only a small,
specialized group of individuals, Merges’s task is daunting.
Merges traverses this problem by pivoting and presenting a system of property
rights to those in the original position that inherently includes limiting principles
such as Kant’s UPR. Merges’s framework incorporates the idea that “provision[s]

195. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971).
196. MERGES, supra note 28, at 105.
197. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 298 (1993).
198. Id. One other, wider conception is a socialistic model of private property as opposed
to the individualistic model of private property.
199. Id.
200. RAWLS, supra note 195, at 136–42.
201. Id. at 136–37.
202. MERGES, supra note 28, at 109 (emphasis added); see also RAWLS, supra note 195,
at 136–42 (discussing the original position).

2013]

“JUSTIFYING” THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1073

for the destitute and other social needs”203 are “baked in,”204 or inseparable from,
property rights. Merges recognizes that “[s]ocial influences go into the making of
creative works, so societal claims deserve to be thought of as integral to the rights
that cover those works.”205 In that way, Merges softens the binary notions that there
are either intellectual property rights that are not arranged “to the greatest benefit to
the least advantaged,”206 as required by Rawls’s First Principle, or that there simply
are no intellectual property rights. Merges shades Rawls’s black and white world
with some hues of gray—enough gray area that those in the original position might
reasonably agree to a system of property that is part of a set of basic liberties.207
If those in the “original position” would ultimately agree to include intellectual
property as a “basic liberty”—not a small assumption, to say the least208—the
specifics of how Merges’s framework operates can be explored. It is at this point
that Merges’s framework begins to truly come together and becomes a powerful
analytical prism to explore intellectual property rights without having to speak
directly about utilitarian justifications for the property right in the first place. The
framework rests on the theories of Locke and Kant to justify and conceptualize the
initial property grant. The Lockean provisos and Kant’s UPR limit the initial grant
based on the needs of others (but, remember that these limits tend to “lead a mostly
closeted existence”209). Only after intellectual property is fundamentally rooted as
an individual right or a “basic liberty,” providing its owners with the Kantian
autonomy to thrive and prosper, do distributive theories come into play.
Distributive theories curtail only “the way an IP right is deployed,” not the way
they are granted.210 Because “[r]ights that are fair when granted may turn out to
harm third parties,” the framework provides “a second opportunity to assess the
distributional impacts of IP law.”211 The assessment, in Merges’s model, can be
best conceptualized by envisioning the intellectual property right having “two
separate components: [a core] inviolable individual contribution . . . and a

203. MERGES, supra note 28, at 110.
204. Id. at 123.
205. Id. at 122. We are all influenced by our surroundings and our society, through
education and parenting, for example, and we all, therefore, owe some part of any creative
endeavor to society.
206. RAWLS, supra note 195, at 302.
207. C.f., e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 274 (1988).
Waldron, like Rawls, draws bright lines.
208. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 197, at 338 (“[E]ven if by some convincing
philosophical argument—at least convincing to us and a few like-minded others—we could
trace the right of private or social ownership back to first principles or to basic rights, there is
a good reason for working out a conception of justice which does not do this.” (emphasis
added)); see also id. at 339. Merges does not reconcile Rawls’s qualms, but Merges does
acknowledge that he may be unable to because of the extreme position that Rawls’s theory
represents.
209. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the seldom use of the three
Lockean provisos in his framework).
210. MERGES, supra note 28, at 129 (emphasis in original).
211. Id.; see also id. at 184 (“It is not possible, in a complex field such as IP, that all
third-party effects of a given appropriation of resources can be foreseen at the time of initial
appropriation.”).
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component . . . owing its origins to social forces and factors.”212 This second
component, “the periphery,”213 symbolizes that “society retains a stake in every
work” because, in almost every imaginable case, “forces beyond an individual
creator go into . . . creative work[s].”214 In that way, distributive justice is internal
to any property rights and a balance must be maintained. In most cases, time
limitations on rights that make sure intellectual property is eventually placed in the
public domain215 and taxation216 are the primary—and sufficient—vehicles for
effectuating distributional justice under Merges’s model. Thus, the framework,
fully assembled, satisfies the two Rawlsian principles of justice;217 the first is
overlapped by the consideration of the Lockean provisos, particularly Kant’s UPR,
and the second is satisfied because intellectual property benefits the worst off
because its special rewards have a “net positive distributional effect” via taxation
and time-limits.218
B. Other Justifying Intellectual Property Considerations and Principles
After setting up the foundational layers of his framework, Merges moves on to
discuss the so-called midlevel principles and other highly specific issues that
complete the model. Merges espouses four midlevel principles, or “concepts that
run through and tie together disparate doctrines and practices, and that provide a
common policy vocabulary that bridges different foundational viewpoints.”219 All
four principles220 are important to understanding Merges’s framework, but only
one, proportionality, has major implications on the use of public interest in Section
337 investigations at the ITC and in federal district court patent litigation.
For Merges, proportionality is the principle that supports the proposition that
“[t]he size or scope of an IP right ought to be proportional to the value or
significance of the work covered by the right.”221 It is in this principle that Merges
explores eBay222 and, tangentially, the issues of denying permanent injunctions—a
result that he considers “a serious inroad on one of the classic appurtenances of a
property right.”223 Under a normative understanding of intellectual property as a
fundamental right, one would agree with the Federal Circuit’s historical “automatic

212. Id. at 121.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 122–23; see also id. at 308 (“Rawls gives us a philosophy that systematically
and broadly shows how to value each individual.”).
215. Id. at 130.
216. Id. at 132–33; see also id. at 308 (“[B]uild in limits on these claims, and allow
society its own claim to some of the proceeds from property, in the form of taxation.”).
217. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
218. MERGES, supra note 28, at 136.
219. Id. at 139.
220. The four midlevel principles are non-removal, efficiency, dignity, and
proportionality. Id.
221. Id. at 150.
222. “Proportionality is the principle behind the eBay case in patent law.” Id. at 165; see
also eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
223. MERGES, supra note 28, at 150.
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injunction rule,” where a party successfully shown to infringe a patent would be
enjoined from making, using, or selling the infringing product, method, etc. Indeed,
from a high-level prospective, it is difficult to reconcile how any other rule would
not totally undermine the classic appurtenance of a property owner’s basic ability
to exclude others. Merges explains that where there is “undue leverage” or
“economic power beyond what is legitimate,” a notion of proportionality prevents
an injunction where it would not serve the public interest.224
Merges only sees this function of the proportionality principle as proper where
there is clearly “undue leverage” or, in other words, “[w]here the unregulated
market price of a property right moves radically out of alignment with underlying
social utility, an institutional response is called for.”225 Unlike strict libertarian
theorists, Merges argues that “if there is a pervasive understanding that property
rights can be adjusted after the fact and at the margin to take account of changed
circumstances or urgent social needs, this understanding will naturally be
incorporated into the settled expectations of all property holders.”226 Occasional
rebalances would, therefore, not disrupt the settled expectations of property
holders.227 This notion of correction for social imbalances aligns with Merges’s
conception of Rawlsian distributive justice: because society, at least in “the
periphery,”228 contributes to the value of any piece of intellectual property,229
rebalancing the reward between the owner and society is justifiable and a matter of
appropriate fairness.230 As can be seen from Merges’s choice of language, however,
the adjustments that he contemplates as being governed by an ex post
proportionality principle are those that are “radical imbalances”231 and “urgent
social needs.”232 It is an “[i]mportant, but [m]odest, [p]rinciple”: “[the] business of
court intervention into private market ordering is and should be a highly unusual
event.”233
III. APPLYING THE MERGES FRAMEWORK
Understanding Merges’s foundational framework, which is based on a
combination of Locke’s provisos and his labor theory of appropriation, Kant’s
UPR, and Rawls’s distributive justice—as well as Merges’s midlevel
proportionality principle—allows one to think about specific applications of the
framework. Merges tackles many specific issues as a final feature of his book, but
he does not address the use of the public interest factors in Section 337 ITC
investigations. The Commission’s broad authority to deny exclusion orders based

224. Id. at 166; see also eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. MERGES, supra note 28, at 181.
226. Id. at 183.
227. Id. at 184.
228. Id. at 121–22.
229. See supra text accompanying note 205.
230. MERGES, supra note 28, at 189 (noting that it is appropriate “to intervene when
fundamental fairness demands it”).
231. Id. at 184.
232. Id. at 183.
233. Id. at 189.
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on the public interest raises serious questions about the justifiability of doing so.
And, while actions at the ITC may indeed be fundamentally different from civil
actions under the “the long-standing principle that importation is treated differently
than domestic activity,”234 Section 337 investigations provide a unique look at
public interest considerations. The only remedies available at the ITC are injunctive
remedies—the ITC cannot award money damages.235 By studying cases where the
possibility of monetary remedies as a way to balance the harms236 is removed, we
can eliminate variables and isolate the binary decision to derogate a patent owner’s
right to exclude or not.
Applying the Merges framework to the three instances at the ITC, where
permanent exclusion orders were denied to complaintants in light of the public
interest, helps illuminate the justifiability of doing so.
A. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders
In Crankpin Grinders, the patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 3,118,258 (the ’258
patent), claimed a machine that automatically grinded crankpins for use in internal
combustion engines in passenger cars. The invention, and true intellectual property,
was in the fact that the machine required no human intervention to perform the
rotary indexing of the crankpin grinder from one pin to another.237 In other words,

234. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting Spansion, Inc. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
235. See Evans, supra note 2, at 750 (“The ITC cannot award money damages, but it can
issue three forms of injunctive remedy: limited exclusion orders, general exclusion orders,
and cease and desist orders.” (footnotes omitted)).
236. When there are multiple forms of remedies available, the courts are able to balance
the various remedies. One commentator, discussing eBay, has discussed such a balance act
as a “three bears” reasoning:
Justice Thomas utilized Three Bears reasoning again, this time writing for the
Court, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. In eBay, the Court overturned a
permanent injunction issued by the Federal Circuit to protect a business-method
patent that defendant, eBay, had infringed upon its successful auction website.
The Court was concerned that each party sought extreme positions as plaintiffs
argued patentees were always entitled to equitable relief in addition to damages,
and defendants argued injunctions were never appropriate. Thomas criticized the
appellate court for granting too much relief by establishing a categorical rule
under which patent holders were always entitled to an injunction. He also
chastised the district court for erring “in the opposite direction” by awarding too
little relief by holding that business method patentees never need an injunction
because they could always remedy their loss with damages. The Supreme Court
in eBay thus eschewed the “broad classifications” and “expansive principles” at
the far ends of the remedial spectrum, reiterating the importance of balance
between interests as necessary to determining the remedy that is just right in
each case.
Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 73, 85 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
237. See U.S. Patent No. 3,118,258 col.1 (filed March 3, 1961).
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the machine could automatically index in order to grind all of the various pins on
the crankshaft without human intervention.
Starting with the initial consideration of appropriation, using Merges’s
articulation of Lockean labor theory, the inventors, Ralph Price and Harold
Balsiger,238 expended effort to develop and appropriate the grinding technology.239
By mixing their labor with the universe of prior art (similar to the realm of nature,
as discussed above240), the inventors have valid dominion over the technology. The
inventors’ labor was not merely a trivial step or obvious progression in the art—the
technology was the result of labor plus ingenuity. In fact, the invention was
declared non-obvious and useful241 by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) upon its initial grant. Similarly, under Kantian notions of initial
appropriation, Price and Balsiger “imposed their will on things”242 in order to
further their individual plans, objects, and goals—their appropriation of automatic
crankpin grinding technology helped to expand their free will (or, at least the free
will of the Landis Tool Corporation, the assignee of the patent243). Initial
appropriation is justifiable because it is essential to the creators’ autonomy.
Under Merges’s framework, initial appropriation may be limited or bounded,
even if such rights are rarely bounded from the outset. Looking at the Lockean
provisos,244 it is clear that there was no issue with the sufficiency proviso. The
inventors appropriated a right to a technology that does not raise concerns about
leaving “enough, and as good”245 for others—there is still room in the field for
others to operate as can be seen from four patents issued over the span of a few
decades referencing the ’258 patent.246 “Reliance” arguments under the sufficiency
proviso are only appealing at first glance. Because it is easy to image that
automobile manufacturers came to rely on automatic crankpin grinders in an
important way, so much so that removing access to them would work a significant
harm, it is tempting to grasp onto reliance as justifying a limitation. Reliance,
however, is reserved for nearly earth shattering movements in culture—for
example, the Internet or the car as a means for transportation—whereas “[m]ost
contributions to culture are more like isolated drops in a lake.”247 Automatic
crankpin grinders cannot reasonably constitute an example of such a movement.

238. Id.
239. See supra text accompanying note 133.
240. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
241. Utility and novelty are two of three principal criteria for a valid patent. See FRANK
H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS 32 (2d ed. 1993).
Patents are presumed valid after the USPTO examines and grants the inventors the certificate
of issuance. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
242. See MERGES, supra note 28, at 70; see also supra note 170 and accompanying text.
243. ’258 Patent.
244. See supra Part.II.A.1.
245. See supra text accompanying note 153.
246. See U.S. Patent No. 3,935,675 (filed Aug. 16, 1974); U.S. Patent No. 4,023,937
(filed Apr. 10, 1973); U.S. Patent No. 4,337,011 (filed Apr. 16, 1980); U.S. Patent No.
4,693,038 (filed Apr. 4, 1986).
247. See MERGES, supra note 28, at 55; see also supra text accompanying note 157–59.
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Similarly, the spoliation proviso does not limit the right because Landis Tool
Corporation was working the patent, producing crankpin grinders. Recall that,
under Merges’s conception, spoliation does not refer to unsatisfied market
demand.248 While the Commission insinuated that the unsatisfied demand in the
marketplace was a significant reason behind denying an injunction,249 using
spoliation as a valid justification would require that Landis put their crankpin
grinder technology to absolutely no productive use.250 Locke’s third proviso, the
charity proviso, is not invoked because Landis is in no way letting its brothers
“perish for want” by enforcing their patent claims to automatic crankpin grinding
technology.251 Even if the relevant perspective was stretched to include the longterm implications of not using cars with lower fuel efficiency,252 which might
impinge on the human race’s ability to prosper and flourish,253 it likely would still
not invoke the proviso under Merges’s framework without bearing down on true
and measurable life-or-death matters.
Kant’s UPR254 should also be considered in evaluating the initial property grant.
The broad and malleable nature of the UPR focuses the inquiry on the question of
whether the right “interfere[s] with the freedom of [other] citizens.”255 Under
Kantian theory, the state is permitted to limit the scope of the right, but since the
appropriation of the technology here does not create a prima facie case of
interference with the freedom of other citizens, the right is not justifiably limited
from the outset. Rather, the appropriation here is exactly the type of permissible
control that Kant envisions—it is crucial to the development of Landis, Price, and
Balsiger’s goals, and to their autonomy. It simply does not raise the fundamental
moral concerns that the UPR stands to protect.
After examining the pregrant considerations of intellectual property rights, it is
clear that if the derogation or limitation of a right is to be justifiable in light of
“public interest,” it must be justified according to the postgrant doctrines. In
Merges’s view, this makes perfect sense because “[t]he dynamic nature of IP in
practice makes the postgrant stage the crucial time for bringing balance to the IP

248. See supra text accompanying note 160.
249. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 8
(Dec. 1979) (Final); see also Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Moreover . . . the exclusion order was denied because inadequate supply
within the United States—by both the patentee and domestic licensees—meant that an
exclusion order would deprive the public of products necessary for some important health or
welfare need: energy efficient automobiles, basic scientific research, or hospital
equipment.”).
250. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing how Locke was only
concerned with truly abject waste).
251. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
252. Long-term implications might include, for example, depleting the ozone layer,
global warming, and other side effects from greenhouse gases.
253. See MERGES, supra note 28, at 40–41, 62.
254. See supra Part II.A.2.
255. MERGES, supra note 28, at 90; see also KANT, supra note 176, at 45 (“Every Action
is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can co-exist
along with the Freedom of the Will of each and all in action, according to a universal
Law.”); supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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system.”256 It does not make logical sense, given the incentives created by a system
of intellectual property rights, to limit intellectual property based on merely
speculative concerns at the time of the initial appropriation, but rather to wait until
more information about the distributive fairness of the property right is in hand.
In Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the Commission majority stated that
“[t]he public as a whole has an interest in conserving fuel through the provision of
energy efficient alternatives represented in this case by automobiles.”257 The
independent government agencies best positioned to provide an objective statement
of the balance between the “core” and “periphery” of the property right258 stated
that they had “no comment to make on the certain automatic crankpin grinder
investigation.”259 Instead, information about the public’s stake in the periphery of
the patent claims was provided by General Motors Corporation and Caterpillar
Tractor Company—parties with biased interests.260 For example, Caterpillar alleged
that there was a “direct relationship between excluding importation of machines
and the ability of U.S. engine manufacturers to extend or refine engine
manufacturing capabilities.”261 From the record, it was clear that Landis was not
able to deliver new automatic crankpin grinders in a “commercially reasonable
length of time.”262 As such, the public, at least under the perspective of the
Respondents, General Motors and Caterpillar, indeed had a stake in periphery of
the intellectual property right that was positioned to be undermined by excluding
importation.
What is not clear is whether it was the public that the interested parties were
truly concerned about—companies like Ford and GM were struggling to profitably
compete with foreign automobile manufacturers and were struggling to survive
during a recession that struck hardest on the automobile manufacturing industry.263
It is also not clear that the public was at significant risk of not having fuel-efficient
cars during a limited time of a supposed energy crisis, as foreign manufactures may
have been able to supply the market. Under Rawlsian distributive justice, Landis’s
ownership of the intellectual property at issue was not disrupting each person’s
right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties264 or disrupting the
“greatest benefit of the least advantaged.”265 While it may be that Ford and GM
could ultimately provide cheaper fuel-efficient cars to the public without having to
worry about the property rights of Landis, Merges has shown how that position, by

256. MERGES, supra note 28, at 303.
257. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 20
(Dec. 1979) (Final).
258. See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
259. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 4
(Dec. 1979) (discussing that the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare filed statements that each had no advice or information with respect
to “public health”).
260. Id. at 4–5.
261. Id. at 5.
262. Id. at 18.
263. See supra notes 75–77, 83 and accompanying text.
264. See RAWLS, supra note 195, at 302 (referring to Rawls’s first principle).
265. Id.
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itself, would make a mere sham of property rights. It will almost always be the case
that open-access to property in technology would lead to cheaper goods, but the
true social and systemic costs quickly outweigh that myopic, short-term goal.
Looking to the proportionality principle for further clarification of the balance
between the core and periphery of Landis’s intellectual property right, the principle
reaffirms that the alleged harm was not one that disrupted the equality and justice
owed to the public. Analyzing whether the size of the intellectual property right is
commensurate with the value of the work shows that Landis’s enforcement was
well within the appropriate bounds. The technology was developed with ingenuity
over time266 and resulted in a machine that could automatically grind all of the
crankpins on a crankshaft. The efficiencies that resulted were tremendous and
commanded a market value of over $250,000. At the same time, Landis’s “prices
were lower than the prices of the imported grinders” and Landis had “licensed its
patent to another domestic producer as well as on a spot basis to a foreign
producer.”267 In other words, as the dissenting commissioners implied, Landis in no
way wielded “economic power beyond what is legitimate”268—the facts show a
dearth of “undue leverage.”269 There is no “radical imbalance” present,270 and there
is no proof of a nexus between GM and Ford’s need for automatic crankpin
grinders to compete in the market place and the ongoing “energy crisis” that may
have perhaps constituted an “urgent social need.”271 Technology developments or
components other than a machine that automatically indexed the diameter of
various crankpins could have allowed GM and Ford to meet fuel efficiency goals.
Automatically grinded crankpins were likely but a very small contributor to the
goal of fuel efficient automobiles.
B. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes
Like Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the facts of Certain Inclined-Field
Acceleration Tubes are not ripe for addressing the question of limits on the initial
appropriation of rights. True, it is tempting to use the facts surrounding Certain
Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes as an example of when no property rights should
initially be conferred because of the sense that nuclear development is a societal,
national-security issue. Merges’s framework, however, demands that the inquiry
focus on “property, but”: “The result . . . is to reject both the ‘property first’ and
‘property last’ approaches. Instead [to] advocate something closer to ‘property,
but.’”272 Limitations based on the Lockean provisos are not warranted, and Kant’s
UPR does not run afoul when the property claims do not affect societal equality

266. The ’258 patent crossed referenced four prior patents that issued from 1953 to 1959
as sources of prior art that lead to the understanding and development of the claimed
technology. See ’258 Patent.
267. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 1–
2 (Dec. 17, 1979) (Final) (Comm. Moore’s supplemental views).
268. See supra text accompanying note 224.
269. See supra text accompanying note 225.
270. See supra text accompanying note 231.
271. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
272. MERGES, supra note 28, at 308.
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and justice from the outset. Under Kantian theory, it may be permissible for the
state to decide that patent claims that bear on issues of national defense should not
be conferred. And, in fact, the United States already has such a provision, but
decided not to use it when issuing U.S. Patent No 3,308,323 (the ’323 patent).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 181, the Commission of Patents has the responsibility to limit
property grants that have national security implications:
Whenever the publication or disclosure of an invention by the
publication of an application or by the granting of a
patent . . . might . . . be detrimental to the national security, he shall
make the application for patent in which such invention is disclosed
available for inspection to the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of any other department or
agency of the Government designated by the President as a defense
agency of the United States.273
No such detriment was found for the ’323 patent, so it can be fairly assumed that
the claimed tube technology was considered by the state to have no prima facie
national security implications. As such, limits on initial appropriation continue their
mostly “closeted existence.”274
Limitations to consider, therefore, come by way of postgrant doctrines. Similar
to Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the government agencies that were
positioned to best determine whether the public had a sufficient enough stake in the
“periphery” of the intellectual property right to justify denying an exclusion order
declined to file statements of the public interest during the investigation.275
However, the National Science Foundation, an independent government agency,
filed a statement opposing an exclusion order. While the Commission partially
justified the denial of an exclusion order on its notion “that basic scientific
research, such as the nuclear structure research . . . is precisely the kind of activity
intended by Congress to be included when it required the Commission to
consider . . . the public health and welfare,” it readily admits that the “benefits to
public health and welfare of pure research are indirect and perhaps more difficult to
demonstrate.”276 The Commission awkwardly discussed the “patent monopoly” as a
way to “recover research and development expense and provide a financial
reward,”277 as if the property right in patents is merely a conduit for financial
gain,278 carelessly brushing aside the fundamental ownership of the property. The

273. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,
supra note 138, at § 115.
274. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
275. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Final).
276. Id. at 22–23.
277. Id. at 26.
278. See contra, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 510–11 (1917) (“Since . . . 1829 this court has consistently held that the primary
purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents
but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts.’” (emphasis added)).
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Commission, sensing an inequality and injustice, blundered through its analysis but
ultimately reached the correct outcome.
The ITC’s analysis would greatly benefit from an understanding of Merges’s
framework. The Commission had all of the right facts to deny the remedy, without
any of the coherent logic. The focus should have been on the “undue leverage”
created by the facts of the case in conjunction with the public’s extra strong stake in
the property claim. The Commission correctly pointed out that the property
owners’ property was subsidized by society—more so than what normally occurs—
because of the government’s infusion of money into this particular research
industry. Here the “core” and “periphery” of the right are different from what is
typical: the periphery is much larger. That aspect of proportionality is coupled with
another aspect: the property right was creating more economic leverage in favor of
HVEC than it deserved, commensurate with its ownership in the “core” of the right.
First, the imported tubes were not interchangeable with the claimed tubes. The
imported Dowlish tubes had different geometries that allowed for “greater
performance per dollar.”279 While there was testimony to contradict the
performance claims, the fact remained that unless an exclusion order was denied,
many research institutes would have to pause research, incur large retrofitting
expenses, or close facilities outright. At a time when society and the state had
overriding needs—maybe even “urgent needs”—in light of nuclear arms
development, and also had an abnormally large periphery ownership in
development of an intellectual property right, the state properly denied the “core”
property owner its right to exclude in this limited instance.
C. Certain Baseband Processor Chips
As with the two previous fact patterns, the initial appropriation of the inventions
claimed in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,374,311; 6,714,983; 5,682,379; 6,359,872, and
6,583,675, all of which relate to cellular device microchips and cellular telephone
handsets, was valid and justifiable under Lockean and Kantian theory, as adopted
by Merges. This case, however, represents another situation where, because of
changes in the marketplace, the patentee arguably garnered undue economic
leverage. Interestingly, however, the facts and timing of Certain Baseband
Processor Chips provide a great case study for the rarely seen “reliance” aspect of
the proportionality principle and Lockean sufficiency proviso.280
While the complainant, Broadcom, only named one respondent, Qualcomm, the
true international scale and implications of the investigation was evident from the
intervening parties: Cellco d/b/a Verizon Wireless, LG Electronics Mobilecomm,
Motorola, Kyocera, Sprint Nextel Corporation, Samsung Electronics,281 and
eventually nonparty intervenors T-Mobile and AT&T Mobility.282 The intervenors
were permitted to submit evidence and statements regarding the remedy and

279. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119.
at 26 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Final).
280. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
281. Certain Baseband Processor Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258 (Oct.
2011) (Final).
282. Id.
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bonding phase of the investigation—the public interest. In other words, the
exclusion of Qualcomm chips in light of Broadcom’s patented property affected
nearly every major cellular mobile service provider and manufacturer in the world.
At the time of the investigation there were approximately 215 million cell phone
users in the United States,283 roughly 70 percent of the entire resident population.284
As Wendy Gordon might argue, the introduction, or really the tidal wave, of
mobile devices with the feature claimed in the disputed patents shifted the cultural
“baseline.”285 The original creator, Broadcom, added something to the culture of
society that society came to depend on so heavily that removing access to that
something would actually injure society. The importance of Broadcom’s
technology in relation to the nation’s reliance on mobile networks and particularly
the speed of 3G broadband services is enormous—the reliance ranges from
individual citizens to large-scale societal security.286 While Broadcom was not
trying to outright exclude any public access to their microchip technology, Gordon
and Merges might still agree that the practical effects of an exclusion order against
Qualcomm would be close enough to an outright exclusion to work a similar public
harm. And, even if the reliance aspect of the proportionality argument is not
sufficient to justify derogating Broadcom’s fundamental right to the intellectual
property it appropriated, other notions of undue leverage fit in seamlessly to
reinforce the proportionality arguments. Namely, due to the “standards-type”287
nature of the microchips and a lack of satisfactory non-infringing alternatives,
Broadcom wielded too much economic force over the marketplace. This is true
even if Broadcom did not lay in wait like the “bad-actors” or nonpracticing entities
discussed or addressed in eBay.288
The Commission, not able to articulate a reliance argument like that of
Gordon’s, and without the philosophical framework to appreciate the undueleverage aspect of proportionality, grasped at national-security type justification for
limiting the general exclusion order.289 The Commission stated that “public safety
officials appear to be increasingly relying on the data capabilities of 3G
telecommunications networks in carrying out their functions, and anticipate that

283. Id. at 13.
284. The U.S. population in 2011 was approximately 310 million people. See UNITED
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, USA QUICK FACTS, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/00000.html.
285. Gordon, supra note 156, at 1567 (“[O]nce a creator exposes her intellectual product
to the public, and that product influences the stream of culture and events, excluding the
public from access to it can harm.”).
286. Certain Baseband Processor Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258 (Oct.
2011) (Final).
287. The FCC regulated the telecommunication industry using a flexible licensing
program instead of a strict standards-type approach. Regardless, the same interoperability
concerns abound. Id.
288. Id. at 140–141 (For example, “Qualcomm points out that the record shows that
secure high-speed wireless telecommunication through EV-DO networks is essential to
ensuring public safety and welfare and to national security” going on to state that such
networks “allow first responders to receive messages and videos while simultaneously on a
call, such as a 911 call.”).
289. Id. at 24.
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this reliance will greatly increase in the near future.”290 The Commission also
considered the domestic economy and individual citizen’s access to the technology
in constructing an order but never quite pulled it all together. Nevertheless, the
Commission fashioned a wise and thoughtfully balanced remedy. The Commission,
in full recognition of the fundamental nature of the property, studied its fully
developed record to find where the least injury would be worked on society, the
owners of the “periphery,” and Broadcom, the owner of the “core.” The
Commission allowed some already imported chips and handsets to be exempt from
the exclusion order (that is, those devices which the public and the market had
already come to rely on), while excluding the majority of future imports.291
IV. ADOPTING A FRAMEWORK
Areas of success and failure within the Commission’s analysis can be identified
by examining the ITC cases in which general exclusion orders were denied. For
example, as discussed above, the dissenting commissioner’s views in Certain
Automatic Crankpin Grinders provided a close example of a philosophically and
morally justifiable approach to addressing the public interest in patent litigation.
That commissioner was correct in first identifying the patent as a fundamental
property right.292 Also, that commissioner, when stating that “Congress was
particularly concerned about price gouging or monopolistic practices,”293 was
resonating notions of undue leverage. In comparison, the majority in Certain
Automatic Crankpin Grinders lost focus of what was truly the public interest
comparison. In another example, the Commission in Certain Baseband Processor
Chips developed a very robust record that explored the public interest implications
from a variety of facets and always kept a focus on the patent right and not just the
interests in the patent claims. The Commission was able to construct a remedy that
was neatly tailored and commensurate with ownership stakes in the core and
periphery, given the reliance and undue leverage involved.
What is most evident from examining the ITC cases, however, is that the
Commission lacked a framework for its analysis. Left stranded with only the mere
phrase “the effect of such an exclusion upon the public health and welfare” to grasp
onto, the Commission was free to stumble towards its own subjective conclusions
about when it is appropriate to derogate a property owner’s right to exclude. It is at
this juncture that the cases from the ITC begin to spill their lessons over to patent
cases that arise in federal district courts under the Patent Act. Regardless of
whether there is a “long-standing principle that importation is treated differently
than domestic activity,”294 the two forums can learn from one another to better

290. Id. at 148.
291. Id. at 160.
292. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 1
(Dec. 17, 1979) (Final) (Comm. Moore’s supplemental views) (“A patent is a
constitutionally granted monopoly.”); see also S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 21 (1974).
293. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub., 1022, at 2
(Dec. 17, 1979) (Final) (Comm. Moore’s supplemental views).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20 (discussing and quoting Spansion, Inc. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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understand when the public interest can justifiably be used to trump a property
right. In fact, one commentator has already argued that the “biggest and most
unique advantage of the § 337 litigation—exclusion orders—could be brought in
under the Patent Act.”295 Professor Dennis Crouch has commented that “[i]f the
ITC continues to give more weight to the public interest factor, the result is that
ITC exclusion orders may begin to parallel the injunction that a court would have
ordered under eBay.”296 Both forums would benefit from guidance, factors, or
waypoints to assist when those forums are called upon to venture past the patent as
a property right and right to exclude that it confers. This is especially true going
forward as the public interest factors take a front seat in litigation and as “the
remarkable ongoing expansion of the subject matter covered by various intellectual
property rights” continues.297
In that regard, implementing a new doctrine of patent misuse that clearly adopts
a “property, but” approach to deciding when exclusion orders should or should not
be granted might be a satisfactory means of providing a guiding framework. A new
patent misuse doctrine could be fashioned to heed Judge O’Malley’s call from
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corporation that “even though a
successful patent infringement plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other
short-cuts to support a request for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that
courts should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights
granting the owner the right to exclude,”298 and to also coherently verbalize the
notions of “undue leverage” that can be distilled from the statements of the Court in
eBay.299
A patent misuse doctrine aligns well with the direction of Merges’s framework.
Specifically, after carefully working through the philosophical and moral
justifications for property as a fundamental right, Merges realizes that limits to
rights are most justifiable at a postgrant stage. Most commonly, it is only after first
recognizing property as a fundamental, constitutionally empowered right, derived
from organic U.S. law as a form of private property,300 that it is appropriate to
consider limits on those rights as proportionality and distributive fairness demand.
Moreover, as Merges states, “[t]he dynamic nature of IP in practice makes the
postgrant stage the crucial time for bringing balance to the IP system.”301
Such a doctrine will be important not only in light of the increased awareness of
the public interest factors, but also in light of new technologies that in recent years
have been brought about through scientific endeavor. For example, with modern
advances in genetics, and with cases like Association for Molecular Pathology v.

295. Kumar, supra note 32, at 579.
296. Crouch, supra note 23.
297. Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights
and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 178 (2004) (citing William W. Fisher III,
The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States 1–
10 (1999), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf).
298. 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
299. 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
300. See generally Adam Mosoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689 (2007).
301. MERGES, supra note 28, at 303.
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U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“Myriad”)302 taking the limelight in patent
litigation, some believe that patents concerning genetic engineering and designer
babies are possibly not far away. One commentator has noted that the “[US]PTO
inevitably will grant patents on biological discoveries with such eugenic
potential.”303
Modern medicine currently has the ability to regenerate full fingers from certain
cellular matrices and to grow completely new livers from a combination of fetal
cells and cadaver organs,304 and the future will only bring about more options. Such
new, culturally divisive technologies will raise important questions about the
justifiability of both the initial property grant and the postgrant restrictions. It is in
those moments of divisiveness that a strong, philosophically sound framework for
the understanding of patents as rights will be of most value. New technologies have
the potential to direct discordant results in different jurisdictions across the United
States without a patent misuse doctrine that commands some uniformity.
Currently, the doctrine of patent misuse is limited statutorily by 35 U.S.C.
§ 271. The statute is written in the negative stating first that “[n]o patent owner
otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done
one or more of the following”305 and then enumerating scenarios. The proscribed
scenarios, such as “refus[ing] to license or use any rights to the patent,”306 helps
ensure that the ownership rights that the patent confers are not arbitrarily
diminished. It also tries to recognize distributive inequality through economic
anticompetiveness such as when it states that it is not misuse to condition the
license of a patent “on the acquisition of a license to rights in another
patent . . . unless . . . the patent owner has market power in the relevant market.”307

302. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part sub nom. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reversing the
district court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to Myriad’s composition claims to
isolated DNA), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1794 (remanding for reconsideration in light of Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)), op. on remand 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). Commentators strongly suggested that the
Supreme Court would hear the case on certiorari. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch & Jason
Rantanen, Patentable Subject Matter and the Supreme Court Myriad Preview, PATENTLYO
L. BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011, 8:24 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/08/patentablesubject-matter.html. Oral arguments will be heard before the Supreme Court on April 15,
2013.
303. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573,
578 (2006).
304. See Daniel J. DeNoon, First Human Liver Grown in Lab, WEBMD HEALTH NEWS
(Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.webmd.com/news/20101029/first-human-liver-grown-in-lab
(“The organs are grown on ‘scaffolds’ created from cadaver organs. . . . When fetal cells
from the appropriate organ are pumped into the scaffold, they hone in on the appropriate
location and begin to grow.”).
305. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
306. Id.
307. Id. (emphasis added).
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The current patent misuse doctrine, however, only goes halfway. It does not
clearly articulate the philosophically justifiable notions it tries to protect or, at best,
does so in a nonsequential order. A new patent misuse doctrine that borrows from
the conclusions utilized in Merges’s framework could help guide both courts and
litigants who face issues of public interest. A clear articulation of a “property, but”
formula would provide a philosophically justifiable roadmap for an analysis.
Ultimately, such a use of the framework is likely what Merges had in mind as he
tried to create a justification for intellectual property that is a “lock-solid, airtight
case, a case we can confidently take to an unbiased jury of hardheaded social
scientists.”308
CONCLUSION
This Article posits that “public interest” factors are likely to take a more
prominent role in patent litigation arising under the Patent Act in federal district
courts and under Section 337 investigations at the ITC. At the ITC, with the recent
changes in the rules governing the statutory public interest factors in Section 337
forcing litigants to make public interest statements at the onset, parties will be
spending more time and resources on public interest arguments.309 In the district
court, the transition from the “automatic rule,” where injunctions were denied in
only “rare instances,” to a post-eBay world, where in one in four cases an
injunction is denied, the “public interest” prong of the four factor test is now
positioned front-and-center.310 Moreover, with new developments in the sciences
that have spawned the “pervasive creep of technology into formerly sacrosanct
areas of life,” the public interest component will likely be a tool used to resist that
progression.311
Since “[a] patent is a property right” and “[m]ost people associate property
rights with ownership” or the right to exclude,312 using the public interest to
derogate that right is a step that should not be lightly taken. Careful consideration is
necessary before denying a patent owner’s ability to exclude, since it has the
potential not only to disrupt the delicate balance of incentives that the patent system
provides, but to undermine the philosophical and fundamental rights inherent in our
society. Professor Robert Merges has recognized the value of such careful
consideration. The purpose of Merges’s book, Justifying Intellectual Property, was
to provide an analytical framework, rooted in the pillars of philosophy that
acknowledges intellectual property as a fundamental right foremost. This Comment
has distilled Merges’s framework into a form applicable to studying several cases
in which the public interest was found by the ITC to overcome the patent owner’s
right to exclude. In that way, this Comment has attempted to “justify” the public
interest.

308. MERGES, supra note 28, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
309. Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,803 (Oct. 19, 2011) (to be
codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 210); see also Bell, supra note 24.
310. See supra Part I.A.
311. Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of
Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 815 (2008).
312. Farnese, supra note 33, at 4.
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Applying Merges’s framework, based on Lockean appropriations, Kantian
Universal Rights, and Rawlsian ideas of distributive justice, this Comment has
shown that in “public interest” cases thus far, the ITC has lacked consistency and
coherency in its rationale. In the future, there will be a need for a patent misuse
doctrine that codifies a clear framework for derogating property rights in the name
of public interest. Without a flexible, but clear, framework, both the ITC and
Article III federal courts will be free to subjectively interpret the public interest as
they see fit. The discordant results would be counter to the patent law uniformity
that was expressly mandated by Congress when it formed of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.

